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How can self-knowledge of personality be improved?What path is the most fruitful source
for learning about our true selves? Previous research has noted two main avenues for learn-
ing about the self: looking inward (e.g., introspection) and looking outward (e.g., feedback).
Although most of the literature on these topics does not directly measure the accuracy of
self-perceptions (i.e., self-knowledge),we review these paths and their potential for improv-
ing self-knowledge.We come to the conclusion that explicit feedback, a largely unexamined
path, is likely a fruitful avenue for learning about one’s own personality. Speciﬁcally, we sug-
gest that self-knowledge might be fully realized through the use of explicit feedback from
close, knowledgeable others. As such, we conclude that the road to self-knowledge likely
cannot be traveled alone but must be traveled with close others who can help shed light
on our blind spots.
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“Surely I ought to know myself better than these indifferent
outsiders can know me; nay, better even than my intimate
friends, to whom I have never breathed those items of my
inward experience which have chieﬂy shaped my life.
Yet I have often been forced into the reﬂection that even
the acquaintances who are as forgetful of my biography and
tenets as they would be if I were a dead philosopher, are prob-
ably aware of certain points inme whichmay not be included
in mymost active suspicion.We sing an exquisite passage out
of tune, and innocently repeat it for the greater pleasure of
our hearers.” –Eliot (1879, p. 6)
Self-knowledge of personality is far from perfect (Vazire and
Carlson,2010,2011). People sometimes havemistaken views about
how they behave (Gosling et al., 1998; Vazire and Mehl, 2008),
about their motives (Schultheiss and Brunstein, 2001; Schultheiss,
2008), and about their personality traits (Kolar et al., 1996;
Vazire, 2010). As the opening quote from Eliot suggests, there are
important aspects of our personalities that we are unaware of.
Why should we be concerned about the difﬁculty of obtain-
ing self-knowledge? Although there is some controversy about
whether it is better to possess accurate or overly positive self-views
(Kurt and Paulhus, 2008; Kwan et al., 2008), self-knowledge clearly
has its purposes (Dunning et al., 2004). Inmany real-life situations,
the beneﬁts of self-knowledge likely outweigh the costs (e.g., when
deciding what career to pursue). Given the value of accurate self-
views, an important question for personality science to investigate
is: How can self-knowledge of personality be improved?
People typically believe they are the best judges of their ownper-
sonality (Schoeneman, 1981; Schoeneman et al., 1984; Sedikides
and Skowronski, 1995; Pronin et al., 2001;Vazire andMehl, 2008).
Thus, the ﬁrst step to improving self-knowledge is acknowledging
one’s blind spots. However, once a person is open to the idea that
they have misconceptions about their own personality, how can
they go about ﬁxing them? Following in the footsteps of previ-
ous researchers (e.g., Sedikides and Skowronski, 1995; Dunning
et al., 2004), we organize the sources of self-knowledge into two
broad categories: intrapersonal approaches (e.g., introspection)
and interpersonal approaches (e.g., feedback). Below we brieﬂy
review these sources as approaches to improving self-knowledge of
personality, andmake suggestions for future research.We conclude
that the road to self-knowledge is likely interpersonal.
LOOKING INWARD: INTRAPERSONAL ROUTES TO
SELF-KNOWLEDGE
Many aspects of our personality are internal. Our patterns of
thoughts, feelings, desires, and sensations all occur within our own
minds and are not directly observable to others. Furthermore, even
our behavior is, in principle, highly accessible to us. No one else
has the opportunity to observe everything we do. Thus, it seems
natural to presume that reﬂecting on our pattern of mental states
and behaviors should help us learn about our own personality.
Self-focusedmethods for learning about the self have long been
an interest of study in psychology, going back at least to James
(1890). Bem’s (1967) self-perception theory suggests that individ-
uals come to know themselves by observing their own behaviors,
and Duval and Wicklund’s (1972) objective self-awareness the-
ory similarly posits that self-focused attention allows the self to
stand out in one’s consciousness and allows for self-evaluation
against some self standard. Although neither theory is speciﬁcally
about self-knowledge of personality, both point to the potential
for introspection and self-observation to improve self-knowledge.
The important role given to introspection in these classic theo-
ries squares well with the layperson’s view that the self is the best
source of information about what a person is like (Pronin et al.,
2004; Vazire and Mehl, 2008). However, the empirical evidence
supporting self-reﬂection as a route to self-knowledge is mixed
at best.
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INTROSPECTION
Can we learn about our personalities by reﬂecting on ourselves?
In certain cases, the layperson may be correct to think that intro-
spection is a valid source of self-knowledge (Hixon and Swann,
1993; Sedikides et al., 2007). For example, Sedikides and colleagues
found that individualswhohad theopportunity to introspect rated
themselves less positively than did individuals who did not intro-
spect. Although accuracy was not assessed (so we cannot know
if these less positive ratings were more accurate), these ﬁndings
suggest that introspection may reduce bias, at least for those peo-
ple who tend to self-enhance. Likewise, Hixon and Swann (1993)
found that cognitive load led to increased self-enhancement but
that introspection reduced the tendency to self-enhance, sug-
gesting that people with the opportunity to reﬂect provide less
biased self-views. These studies are consistent with other research
showing that depleting self-regulatory resources results in more
positive self-descriptions (Paulhus and Levitt, 1987; Paulhus et al.,
1989; Vohs et al., 2005). Together, these ﬁndings suggest that
introspection may be useful in reducing certain biases (i.e., self-
enhancement), or perhaps simply that self-depletion or cognitive
load lead to overly positive self-views.
Other evidence casts doubt on the viability of self-reﬂection as
a route to self-knowledge.Wilson’s work on the effects of analyzing
one’s feelings or preferences shows that this type of self-reﬂection
can even impede accuracy (Wilson et al., 1995;Wilson, 2002;Wil-
son and Gilbert, 2003; Wilson and Dunn, 2004). Similarly, Silvia
andGendolla (2001)have argued thatmanyof the studies purport-
ing toﬁnd that introspection leads to greater self-knowledgedonot
in factmeasure accuracy using an objective criterion.Nevertheless,
there is some hope for introspection – Schultheiss and Brunstein
(1999), for example, found that guided goal-imagery brought peo-
ple’s explicit motives in line with their implicit motives. More
generally, introspection may work when people pay attention to
subtle cues (Wilson, 2003; Hofmann and Wilson, 2010), or are
educated about the common pitfalls and biases associated with
introspection (Pronin and Kugler, 2007).
SELF-OBSERVATION
One of the tools people can use that may improve the effective-
ness of self-reﬂection is paying attention to their own behavior.
Much research shows that one of the main obstacles to fruitful
self-reﬂection is the excessive weight people place on their inter-
nal thoughts and feelings, at the expense of observing their own
behavior (Pronin and Kugler, 2007; Pronin, 2008). However, an
obvious problem with self-observation is one’s visual perspective.
Individuals are not actually able to look upon themselves from
another’s perspective. No matter how much effort is placed on
imagining one’s physical image, there is no disputing the fact that
there are certain features of the body that are impossible to view
ﬁrsthand in real time. Furthermore, behaviors simply are not as
salient to individuals as are their thoughts and feelings (Malle and
Knobe, 1997).
Perhaps a more promising avenue for self-observation is mak-
ing self-observation literal – that is, showing individuals videos of
themselves. Watching a video of one’s interaction from a third-
person perspective (as opposed to a video from a ﬁrst-person
perspective or no video at all) seems to improve people’s awareness
of their personality, behavior, and the impression they make on
others (Cooper and Thompson, 1971; Storms, 1973; Albright and
Malloy, 1999). However, despite these promising ﬁndings, peo-
ple rarely have the opportunity to view their behaviors from an
actual outside perspective. Furthermore, there is evidence that
these effects may not last more than a few days (Vazire et al., 2009).
In conclusion, the evidence for intrapersonal routes to self-
knowledge is not encouraging. There are inevitable blind spots in
our self-knowledge and the motive for accurate self-assessment is
not always predominant. As a tool for acquiring self-knowledge,
self-awareness likely cuts both ways. Thanks to our self-awareness,
we have the unique ability to reﬂect on our thoughts, feelings, and
desires. However, our self-awareness also burdens us with unique
motivational obstacles to objective self-assessment. That is, all
kinds of motivational baggage comes into play when people judge
themselves that is absent (or less inﬂuential) when judging others
(John and Robins, 1993; Vazire, 2010). Sadly, these obstacles can-
not easily be overcome through introspection or self-observation
alone – whatever biases existed before self-reﬂection are likely to
still be there afterward. Nevertheless, all avenues have not been
explored, and the inclusion of accuracy criteria in future research
may shed further light on the efﬁcacy of self-focused routes to
self-knowledge.
LOOKING OUTWARD: INTERPERSONAL ROUTES TO
SELF-KNOWLEDGE
The idea that we can learn about ourselves from others is as old as
the notion of introspection. Festinger’s (1954) social comparison
theory was originally a theory about self-knowledge – Festinger
believed that people have a drive to evaluate themselves accu-
rately in order to improve their skills and opinions. More recent
research shows, however, that accuracy (i.e., self-assessment) is
only one amongmany self-perception motives, in addition to self-
enhancement, self-veriﬁcation, and self-improvement (Swann and
Read, 1981; Sedikides and Strube, 1995, 1997; Swann and Pelham,
2002). Given the strength of these other motives, social compari-
son is often co-opted for the purpose of boosting one’s self-esteem
or conﬁrming one’s pre-existing self-views, rather than improving
self-knowledge (Wood et al., 1994).
A similarly idealistic theory about self-knowledge is Cooley’s
(1902) looking-glass theory. According to this theory, people cor-
rectly imagine how others see them, and change their self-views
accordingly. Like social comparison theory, this theory gives an
important role to other people’s perceptions of the self. How-
ever, also like social comparison theory, this theory presumes that
people are capable of (and strive for) objective self-evaluation.
Unfortunately, people’s perceptions of how others see them are far
from perfectly accurate (Carlson et al., 2011a), and when people
are aware of such discrepancies, they are not likely to automat-
ically adopt others’ opinions (Carlson et al., 2011b). Given the
impediments to achieving self-knowledge by using imagined oth-
ers (e.g., through social comparison or reﬂected appraisals), it
may be more fruitful to seek information from real others. Per-
haps what is needed to improve self-knowledge is not the idea or
image of what others think of us, but actual, concrete evidence
about what others think of us, and where we stand relative to
others.
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Before putting too much stock in the promise of feedback
for improving self-knowledge, we ﬁrst need to ask whether oth-
ers have knowledge to impart. That is, do others know things
about us that we do not know about ourselves? Vazire’s (2010)
self-other knowledge asymmetry (SOKA) model (summarized in
Figure 1) proposes that others should know more than the self
about aspects of personality that are observable (e.g., dominant,
funny) and those that are highly evaluative (e.g., attractive, intelli-
gent). This is supported by a number of studies documenting that
these trait attributes, observability and evaluativeness, inﬂuence
the content and validity of self-ratings (e.g., John and Robins,
1993). Furthermore, a growing number of studies are ﬁnding
that, when the trait being judged is observable or highly evalu-
ative, close others provide incremental validity over self-ratings,
and sometimes outperform the self-ratings outright. For exam-
ple, close others’ ratings are more accurate than self-ratings at
predicting creativity (Vazire, 2010), involuntary discharge from
the military (Fiedler et al., 2004), college GPA (Wagerman and
Funder, 2007), job performance (Connelly and Ones, 2010), and
coronary artery calciﬁcation (Smith et al., 2008). Of course, there
are also many constructs for which self-ratings are more valid
than close others’ ratings – the point is not to claim that one per-
spective is more accurate than the other overall, but to establish
that each perspective has some knowledge that the other does not
(Vazire and Carlson, 2011). As Funder’s Realistic Accuracy Model
(RAM) suggests, accurate personality judgment is a complicated
process in which many steps must be achieved (Funder, 1995,
1999). Collectively, the research reviewed suggests that close oth-
ers, such as friends, family members, and coworkers, are often able
to navigate this process and as a result possess knowledge about
a person’s personality that she herself lacks. As such, close others
are a potential source of feedback for improving self-knowledge.
In the sections that follow, we review the evidence concerning
the utility of feedback for improving self-knowledge. We focus
on personality feedback, but where appropriate we draw from the
(much larger) literature on performance feedback and speculate
about how the conclusions from that literature would apply to
personality feedback.
What counts as feedback? As mentioned above, several the-
ories in social and personality psychology propose that people’s
reﬂected appraisals – how they imagine others see them – inﬂu-
ence their self-perceptions.However, this type of“feedback”occurs
FIGURE 1 |The self-other knowledge asymmetry model, summarized
fromVazire (2010).
entirely within the person’s mind, and does not entail any new
information that cannot be accessed through introspection or
self-reﬂection. Another common type of feedback is “bogus” feed-
back, where participants are given information that is supposedly
about their personality, but this information is actually fabri-
cated by the researchers and does not necessarily apply to the
individual. The point of these studies is usually to examine how
people react to positive or negative information about themselves,
rather than to increase self-knowledge. Here we deﬁne feedback
as new, true information about oneself that could not have been
accessed through introspection alone. Typically, this comes from
other people, though it can sometimes come from formal evalu-
ations or other means. A common example of informal feedback
from others involves positive or negative comments from friends.
For example, Joe may one day be told by his close friends (who
have until now kindly put up with him without saying anything)
that he tends to be self-centered, always focusing conversations
on himself. How is Joe likely to react to this feedback? Will he
change his self-perception to be more in line with reality? Will he
change his behavior? Here we review the factors that likely affect
the effectiveness of feedback.
When feedback comes from others, it likely matters a great deal
who the “other” is. Close others are more accurate in their person-
ality judgments than are less well-acquainted others (Colvin and
Funder, 1991; Vazire, 2010). However, level of acquaintance is not
the only factor that can inﬂuence the validity of perceptions, and
hence feedback. Close others often have positive biases about each
other, and so may not be objective in their perceptions, especially
for evaluative traits. Thus, well-acquainted informants who are
not particularly attached to the target may be less biased in their
ratings than those who are very attached to or fond of the target
(Leising et al., 2010). As such, if people can choose who will be
providing the feedback, they are likely to nominate close others
who are likely to be biased. From an accuracy standpoint, the ideal
source of feedback is someone who knows the target well but has
enough distance to be objective. Care must also be taken when
evaluating feedback from individuals with an idiosyncratic nega-
tive view of a person – this can be inaccurate and quite damaging
information. However, if the feedback converges among several
trusted, well-acquainted others, it is more likely this reputation is
relatively accurate.
Of course, in selecting an informant as a source of feedback,
accuracy is not the only consideration. It is also important to take
into account whether the target will accept the feedback, and, not
surprisingly, feedback given by credible sources is more likely to
be accepted (Albright and Levy, 1995; Steelman and Rutkowski,
2004). Furthermore,negative“bogus”personality feedback ismore
likely to be accepted when it is given from individuals of higher
status (Halperin et al., 1976). These ﬁndings indicate the impor-
tance of considering characteristics of the feedback source and his
or her relationship with the recipient when feedback acceptance is
the goal.
Whether a person accepts feedback also depends on charac-
teristics of the target herself. People with high self-esteem are
generally more positive toward the feedback process (Funderburg
and Levy, 1997), and people who have an internal locus of con-
trol tend to view feedback more favorably (Funderburg and Levy,
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1997; Maurer and Palmer, 1999). In general, individuals with a
higher core self-evaluation – that is, high self-ratings on mea-
sures of self-esteem, self-efﬁcacy, emotional stability, and internal
locus of control – respond more positively to feedback (Bono and
Colbert, 2005; Kamer andAnnen, 2010). Higher levels of extraver-
sion and openness to experience may also help individuals react
more openly to negative feedback (Smither et al., 2005). These
individual differences make it apparent that not everyone is open
to explicit feedback and to incorporating others’ views into their
self-knowledge.
How often does feedback happen in everyday life, outside of
business settings and laboratory experiments? We examined this
question in a recent class exercise in which samples of 106 and 76
(182 total) undergraduates wrote essays describing a time inwhich
they learned something new about their personalities. The essays
were coded separately by seven research assistants who were split
across the two samples. These essays were coded for the source
(self vs. other) of the new information learned by the student
(α= 0.84 and 0.85), and how convinced the student seemed of the
new information (on a scale from 1 to 7; α= 0.76 and 0.75). Six
separate research assistants (three for each sample) then rated the
desirability (α= 0.95 and 0.85) and the observability (α= 0.67
and 0.71) of the new information learned (on a scale from 1 to
9). Consistent with the SOKA model (Vazire, 2010), most stu-
dents reported learning about relatively observable and evaluative
traits, which reﬂects the blind spots in self-knowledge. The major-
ity of students (63%) reported learning about their personality
from others (in contrast to 37% who learned from introspec-
tion or self-observation). However, these essays also highlight
an obstacle to the utility of feedback in everyday life. Results of
the combined samples indicate that (a) individuals tend to learn
about less desirable traits from others (M = 3.63) compared to the
self (M = 4.87), t (127.19)=−3.53, p = 0.001, and (b) individu-
als tend to be less convinced of information learned from others
(M = 4.65) compared to the self (M = 5.44), t (179.40)=−6.62,
p< 0.001.
Given that people not only have some difﬁculty believing infor-
mation learned from others, but that they also typically respond
less well to negative than positive feedback (Kluger and DeNisi,
1996; Facteau et al., 1998; Brett and Atwater, 2001; Atwater and
Brett, 2005), it is crucial that people receiving negative feedback are
allowed to process it in the most effective way possible. Although
there is some evidence that individuals who receive negative
feedback aremoremotivated to change (Smither et al., 2003;Atwa-
ter and Brett, 2005), it is important that recipients are not over-
whelmed with negative information (Smither and Walker, 2004).
For both negative and positive feedback, allowing for a processing
phase helps recipients reap the full beneﬁts of feedback. Although
self-improvement does not go hand-in-hand with self-knowledge,
the ﬁndings that attending multiple feedback workshops (Seifert
and Yukl, 2010), discussing feedback with raters (Walker and
Smither, 1999; Smither et al., 2004), and writing reﬂections
about one’s feedback (Anseel et al., 2009) improve related work
performance suggest that individuals are more responsive to
feedback when time and effort are dedicated to processing the
information.
Even under the best circumstances, however, some people will
be resistant to feedback.Aswith other routes to self-knowledge, the
effectiveness of feedbackwill depend inpart on aperson’s goals and
motives. Does he want to improve the accuracy of his self-views? Is
he defensive and interested in protecting or afﬁrming his existing,
biased self-views? Returning to our example of self-centered Joe,
he has several options for how to react to his friends’ feedback.
Joe could deny the feedback, stating that his friends are wrong; he
could accept the feedback as accurate and change his self-views
accordingly; or he could feel pressure to change his behavior as a
result of the negative feedback, without changing his self-views.
All of these choices have their own consequences, the third likely
leading to the most positive social and personal outcomes. If Joe
either accepts the feedback as accurate or changes his behavior
to prove the feedback is inaccurate, these changes could improve
the quality of his relationships at work and in his social life, and
perhaps even the quality of his physical and psychological health
(Dunning et al., 2004).
One uniquely promising aspect of feedback as a route to
self-knowledge is that, unlike the intrapersonal routes to self-
knowledge, feedback actually gives the person new information
to consider. Even if the person does not accept this new informa-
tion right away, she may store it in memory and come back to it
later, perhaps whenmore evidence presents itself that conﬁrms the
original feedback. If a person is confronted with repeated feedback
from trusted sources, and if the recipient is appropriately pre-
pared for the information, knowledge may be gained that would
have otherwise never been possible through self-guided efforts.
In short, the search for self-knowledge likely requires the active
involvement of close others to help ﬁll in our blind spots.
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